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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to propose a generaliza-
tion of previous approaches in qualitative deci-
sion making. Our work is based on the binary
possibilistic utility (PU), which is a possibilis-
tic counterpart of Expected Utility (EU). We first
provide a new axiomatization of PU and study
its relation with the lexicographic aggregation
of pessimistic and optimistic utilities. Then we
explain the reasons of the coarseness of quali-
tative decision criteria. Finally, thanks to a re-
definition of possibilistic lotteries and mixtures,
we present the refined binary possibilistic util-
ity, which is more discriminating than previously
proposed criteria.
1 INTRODUCTION
Decision making and more specifically decision making
under uncertainty play a central role in AI. The standard
approach to modeling such problems is Expected Utility
theory (EU). This framework is particularly appealing as it
has received much attention and is axiomatically justified
(von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944); Machina (1988)).
Its application implies that both uncertainty (described by
probability) and utility about consequences of actions are
numerically valued. Unfortunately in real life problems
these conditions are not always fulfilled. Indeed probabil-
ity may not be suitable to model all kind of uncertainty.
Moreover even when it is, probability and utility can be
difficult to assess. The first point has led to many gener-
alizations or alternatives to probability theory such as the-
ory of evidence (Shafer (1976)), possibility theory (Dubois
and Prade (1990)) or plausibility measures (Friedman and
Halpern (1995)). Qualitative knowledge representation and
qualitative decision making, which are receiving much in-
terest in the AI community in recent years seem to offer a
good framework when facing the difficulties of the second
point. In this paper uncertainty is supposed to be repre-
sented by possibility theory, which is particularly adapted
to modeling situations of partial knowledge.
In qualitative decision making, Boutilier (1994), Bonet and
Geffner (1996), Brafman and Tennenholtz (1997) proposed
approaches consisting in focusing on best/worst outcomes
and/or highest plausibility. More discriminating decision
rules have been proposed. Dubois et al. (1998, 2001) ax-
iomatically justified the use of two criteria: optimistic and
pessimistic utilities. These two approaches have been re-
cently unified in binary possibilistic utility theory by Gi-
ang and Shenoy (2001). Another work of interest is that
of Dubois et al. (2000) who proposed an axiomatics for
the lexicographic aggregation of pessimistic and optimistic
utilities, which consists in applying pessimistic utility first
and refining with optimistic utility to break ties. In Giang
and Shenoy (2005), a brief discussion is led on the relation
betweeen the latter criterion and binary possibilistic util-
ity. Recently Fargier and Sabbadin (2003) have proposed
a refinement of optimistic and pessimistic utilities (replac-
ing min and max by leximin and leximax) and related the
refined criteria to EU.
Binary possibilistic utility seems to be a good framework
as it is a possibilistic counterpart of EU. However it still
suffers from a lack of decisiveness as do many qualitative
decision criteria. The aim of this paper is twofold: to give
a better understanding of binary possibilistic utility and to
provide a more discriminating criterion for decision prob-
lems under possibilistic uncertainty. This criterion can be
viewed as a generalization of the refinements of optimistic
and pessimistic utilities, introduced by Fargier and Sab-
badin (2003).
This article is organized as follows: in Section 2 we recall
the definition of binary possibilistic utility and its relation
with optimistic and pessimistic utilities. Then in Section
3 we provide a new system of axioms for the binary pos-
sibilistic utility, which is more similar to usual axiomati-
zations of EU. In Section 5 we present several sources of
the coarseness of binary possibilistic utilities. This moti-
vates the construction of refined binary possibilistic utili-
ties in Section 6 based on a new definition of possibilistic
lotteries and mixtures. Finally we conclude in Section 7 by
presenting some possible future works.
2 BINARY POSSIBILISTIC UTILITY
In qualitative decision making under uncertainty, decisions
are represented by functions from a finite set of states to
a finite set of consequences. Uncertainty about the actual
state is modeled by a possibility distribution over states.
Thus each decision is associated with a possibility distribu-
tion (or lotteries) over consequences.
This is formalized as follows. Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} de-
note a finite set of consequences. A preference relation
X is defined over this set. This set has a best element
x and a worst element x. Uncertainty is measured on a fi-
nite qualitative scale V endowed with an order relation ≥.
The infinum and the supremum of V are respectively de-
noted by 0 and 1. The max and min operators on V are
respectively denoted by ∨ and ∧. The order reversing in-
volution in V is denoted by n, i.e. n(0) = 1, n(1) = 0 and
λ ≥ λ′ ⇒ n(λ) ≤ n(λ′).
A simple possibilistic lottery is defined as a function from
the set of consequences X to the qualitative scale V . The
set of all such lotteries is denoted by Πˆ(X) = V X . Re-
cursively we define the set of compound lotteries that are
lotteries over lotteries:
Πˆ1(X) = Πˆ(X)
Πˆk(X) = Πˆk−1(Πˆ(X)) ∀k > 1
The set of all (simple and compound) lotteries is then de-
noted by Πˆ∞(X) = ∪∞k=1Πˆk(X).
A normalized lottery is a lottery such as supremum 1 is
reached by at least one consequence. The set of all simple
normalized lotteries is denoted by Π(X) = {π ∈ X V :
∃x ∈ X,π(x) = 1}. Note that Π(X) ⊂ Πˆ(X). In the
same manner, we define the set of all normalized lotteries
Π∞(X). Remark that Π∞(X) ⊂ Πˆ∞(X). As the set of
consequences is finite, a simple lottery π can be written:
[π(x1)/x1, . . . , π(xn)/xn]. For simplicity, x denotes both
an element of X and the degenerated lottery πx ∈ Π(X)
such that πx(x) = 1 and πx(z) = 0, ∀z = x.
The following condition of reduction of lotteries is gener-
ally implicitly assumed in the works dealing with possi-
bilistic decision making.
(R) (Reduction of lotteries)
∀x ∈ X, [λ1/π1, . . . , λm/πm](x) =
m∨
i=1
(
λi ∧ πi(x)
)
It allows compound lotteries to be reduced as simple lotter-
ies. Under this condition we have Π(X) = Π∞(X) and
Πˆ(X) = Πˆ∞(X). We will make this condition explicit
〈1, 0〉
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Figure 1: Binary utility scale UV .
in our presentation as in Section 6 this condition will be
relaxed.
The decision maker’s preference relation over lotteries is
denoted by , which reads “at least as good as”. Strict
preference is denoted by  (asymmetric part of ) and in-
difference by ∼ (symmetric part of ).
In order to formulate the binary possibilistic utility (PU)
introduced by Giang and Shenoy (2001) over Π(X), we
need to define the set of canonical lotteries:
C = {[λ/x, μ/x] : λ, μ ∈ V, λ ∨ μ = 1}
This set plays a special role in the definition of PU as its
elements define the equivalence classes of . In order for
PU to be able to distinguish all these elements, it has to
be defined on a rich enough scale. This scale, which is
isomorphic to C is defined as follows:
UV = {〈λ, μ〉 : λ, μ ∈ V, λ ∨ μ = 1}.
Due to constraint λ∨μ = 1, scale UV is in fact monodimen-
sional (see fig. 1). It is built from the scale of uncertainty
V . A natural order relation 1 can be defined on UV :
〈λ, μ〉 ≥UV 〈λ′, μ′〉 ⇐⇒ (λ ≥ λ′ and μ ≤ μ′).
Operator ∨ is extended as an operator on UV × UV as fol-
lows: 〈λ, μ〉 ∨ 〈λ′, μ′〉 = 〈λ ∨ λ′, μ′ ∨ μ′〉. Remark that
this operator is not the max operator on UV , which would
be define as: max(〈λ, μ〉, 〈λ′, μ′〉) = 〈λ ∨ λ′, μ ∧ μ′〉.
Operator ∧ is extended as an operator on V × UV : λ′ ∧
〈λ, μ〉 = 〈λ′ ∧ λ, λ′ ∧ μ〉.
PU is then defined as a function from Π∞(X) to UV :
PU(π) =
n∨
i=1
(
π(xi) ∧ u(xi)
)
. (1)
where u : X → UV assigns a value for each consequence.
Function u is named basic utility assignment.
We now present the axioms required in the PU representa-
tion theorem:
1This order is expressed in a simpler form than in Giang and
Shenoy (2001). It can be easily checked that the two forms are
equivalent.
(B1) (Preorder) is reflexive and transitive.
(B2) (Qualitative monotonicity)
the restriction of over C satisfies the following condition:
[λ/x, μ/x]  [λ′/x, μ′/x] ⇐⇒ λ ≥ λ′ and μ ≤ μ′.
(B3) (Substitutability)
π1 ∼ π2 ⇒ [λ/π1, μ/π] ∼ [λ/π2, μ/π].
(B4) (Continuity) ∀x ∈ X, ∃σ ∈ C, x ∼ σ.
Axiom (B1) is slightly weaker than the one used by Giang
and Shenoy (2001). Indeed we do not impose the complete-
ness of relation . It can be easily checked that this prop-
erty results from the other axioms. Axiom (B2) expresses a
“rational” way to rank the canonical lotteries. When com-
paring two of these lotteries, one prefers the lottery that
gives the greatest possibility to get x and the lowest possi-
bility to get x. Axiom (B3) states that equivalent lotteries
can be replaced by one another in compound lotteries. Ax-
iom (B4) allows the sure consequences to be compared to
canonical lotteries. This axiom allows the commensurabil-
ity of consequences and uncertainty.
The PU representation theorem established in Giang and
Shenoy (2001) is stated as follows:
Theorem 1 Under Condition (R),  on Π∞(X) satisfies
Axioms (B1) through (B4) if and only if there exists a ba-
sic utility assignment u : X → UV such that
∀π, π′ ∈ Π∞(X), π  π′ ⇐⇒ PU(π) ≥UV PU(π′).
We now present optimistic and pessimistic utilities, axiom-
atized by Dubois et al. (1998, 2001) and relate them to PU.
We assume here that uncertainty and utility are measured
on the same scale2 V . In this framework, the basic utility
assignment (denoted v) is assumed to take values in V . We
can remark that compared to the PU approach, only half
of scale UV is exploited. Then optimistic and pessimistic
utilities are functions from Π∞(X) to V . Optimistic utility
writes:
U+(π) =
n∨
i=1
(
π(xi) ∧ v(xi)
) (2)
and pessimistic utility writes:
U−(π) =
n∧
i=1
(
n(π(xi)) ∨ v(xi)
) (3)
where v : X → V .
We introduce two other axioms needed for the representa-
tion theorem of optimistic and pessimistic utilities:
(B4+) (Optimistic continuity)
∀x ∈ X, ∃λ ∈ V, x ∼ [λ/x, 1/x].
(B4−) (Pessimistic continuity)
∀x ∈ X, ∃μ ∈ V, x ∼ [1/x, μ/x].
2This assumption simplifies the presentation without loss of
generality.
The representation theorem for pessimistic utility as formu-
lated by Giang and Shenoy (2001) states as follows:
Theorem 2 Under Condition (R),  on Π∞(X) satisfies
Axioms (B1) through (B3) and (B4−) if and only if there
exists a basic utility assignment v : X → V such that
∀π, π′ ∈ Π∞(X), π  π′ ⇐⇒ U−(π) ≥ U−(π′).
The relation with PU can be written as follows U(π) =
〈1, n(U−(π))〉. The same representation theorem for op-
timistic utility can be stated with Axiom (B4+) and we
would have U(π) = 〈U+(π), 1〉.
3 A NEW AXIOMATIZATION
As stated by Giang and Shenoy (2001), PU is very simi-
lar to expected utility (EU) where ∨ is replaced by + and
∧ is replaced by ×. This similarity can be axiomatically
explained. Indeed depending on how uncertainty is repre-
sented, a same set of axioms yields both criteria. Here we
propose a set of axioms, more similar to usual axiomatiza-
tions of EU:
(C1) (Total preorder) is reflexive, transitive, complete.
(C2) (Non triviality)
[λ/x, μ/x] ∼ [λ′/x, μ′/x]⇒ (λ = λ′ and μ = μ′)
(C3) (Weak independence)
π1  π2 ⇒ [λ/π1, μ/π]  [λ/π2, μ/π].
(C4) (Continuity)
π1  π2  π3⇒ ∃λ, μ s.t. λ∨ μ = 1, [λ/π1, μ/π3] ∼ π2.
Axiom (C2) precludes the trivial case where all canonical
lotteries are equivalent. The other axioms are inspired by
the set of axioms presented by Machina (1988). Axiom
(C3) states that in a compound lottery replacing a sublot-
tery by a preferred one cannot worsen that lottery. Axiom
(C4) states that any two lotteries can be combined to be
equivalent to any other lottery in between them. These
axioms are well-known in decision theory and focus on
the way that the decision maker constructs his preferences.
From this point of view, these axioms are more natural and
give a better understanding of the properties of PU. In-
deed the order induced by Axiom (B2) is not artificially
imposed in this set of axioms. It will result from them.
We now present a lemma that will be useful for the proof
of our PU representation theorem.
Lemma 1 Under Condition (R), if Axiom (C3) is verified
then for all a, b, c, d ∈ V, a∨b = c∨d = 1, we have (a ≥ c
and b ≤ d)⇒ [a/x, b/x]  [c/x, d/x].
Proof. Let a, b, c, d ∈ V such that a ∨ b = c ∨ d = 1 and
a ≥ c and b ≤ d.
By (C1), we know that x  x. By (C3), [λ/x, μ/π] 
[λ/x, μ/π], ∀π. Choose π = [α/x, β/x]. Then by (R),
[λ∨ (μ∧α)/x, μ∧ β/x]  [μ∧α/x, λ∨ (μ∧β)/x] (4)
Case 1: c = 1. Then a = 1. Let μ = α = 1, λ = d and
β = b. Injecting these values in Equation 4 gives the result.
Case 2: b = 1. Then d = 1. Let μ = β = 1, λ = a and
α = c and the result follows as in the previous case.
Case 3: a = 1 > c and d = 1 > b. We get the result from
λ = μ = 1, β = b and α = c.
Consequently, [a/x, b/x]  [c/x, d/x].
We now state and prove our representation theorem.
Theorem 3 Under Condition (R),  on Π∞(X) satisfies
Axioms (C1) through (C4) if and only if there exists a basic
utility assignment u : X → UV such that
∀π, π′ ∈ Π∞(X), π  π′ ⇐⇒ PU(π) ≥UV PU(π′).
Proof. Under (R), Π∞(X) = Π(X). Therefore we just
need to consider simple lotteries.
(⇒) Assume  satisfies Axioms (C1) to (C4).
To prove this result, we show that Axioms (C1) through
(C4) imply Axioms (B1) through (B4). Obviously (C1)
implies (B1), (C3) implies (B3) and (C4) implies (B4).
We now show that the order UV or equivalently on C de-
fined by Axiom (B2) can be recovered.
Lemma 1 gives the ‘only if’ part of Axiom (B2). Now
choose a, b, c, d such that a ∨ b = c ∨ d = 1 and
[a/x, b/x]  [c/x, d/x]. Assume a = c or b = d. Oth-
erwise the two lotteries are trivially equivalent. Then by
Axiom C2, [a/x, b/x]  [c/x, d/x].
Case 1: c = 1. Assume a < 1. Then b = 1 ≥ d. By
Lemma 1, we have [c/x, d/x]  [a/x, b/x]. Thus there is
a contradiction and a = 1. Similarly if b ≥ d, there would
be a contradiction. Then we have b < d.
Case 2: c < 1. In the same manner, we prove that a ≥ c
and b ≤ d.
This finishes the proof of the ‘if’ part of Axiom (B2).
(⇐) Assume function PU is defined such that π  π ′ iff
PU(π) ≥UV PU(π′), ∀π, π′ ∈ Π(X).
From Theorem 1 relation  verifies Axioms (B1) through
(B4), which gives (C1) and (C2).
We first show Axiom (C4). Let π1, π2, π3 be three lotter-
ies such that π1  π2  π3. For i = 1 . . . 3 it exists λi, μi
such that λi ∨ μi = 1 and PU(πi) = 〈λi, μi〉. This means
that for i = 1 . . . 3, πi ∼ [λi/x, μi/x]. Moreover we know
that for i = 1, 2, λi ≥ λi+1 and μi ≤ μi+1 by Axiom
(B2). Let π = [λ2/π1, μ2/π3]. Then by (B3) and (R),
PU(π) = 〈λ, μ〉 = 〈λ2 ∨ (μ2 ∧ λ3), μ2 ∨ (μ1 ∧ λ2)〉.
Case 1: λ2 = 1. Then λ = 1 and μ = μ2.
Case 2: μ2 = 1. Then λ = λ2 and μ = 1. Consequently
π ∼ π2. This proves (C4).
We now prove Axiom (C3). Let π1 and π2 be two lot-
teries such that π1  π2. Then for i = 1, 2 it exists
λi, μi such that λi ∨ μi = 1 and PU(πi) = 〈λi, μi〉.
Let π be an arbitrary lottery such that PU(π) = 〈λ, μ〉.
Let α, β such that α ∨ β = 1. Then by (B3) and (R),
PU([α/π1, β/π]) = 〈(α∧λ1)∨(β∧λ), (α∧μ1)∨(β∧μ)〉.
By assumption, we know that λ1 ≥ λ2 and μ1 ≤ μ2. Thus
PU([α/π1, β/π]) ≥ 〈(α∧λ2)∨(β∧λ), (α∧μ2)∨(β∧μ)〉.
(C3) is then proved.
Axioms (C1) through (C4) expressed in a probabilistic
setting would entail the use of expected utility.
4 REFINED RANKINGS
In this section we make the relation explicit between PU
and the lexicographic aggregation of pessimistic and op-
timistic utilities, which has been axiomatized by Dubois
et al. (2000). A discussion on this point has been led by
Giang and Shenoy (2005). We give here some new insights.
In this section, we do not limit ourself to normalized lotter-
ies. We define the set of all (non necessarily normalized)
canonical lotteries:
Cˆ = {[λ/x, μ/x] : λ, μ ∈ V }.
Note that constraint λ ∨ μ = 1 is not imposed anymore.
Then an extended utility scale UˆV can be constructed as
follows:
UˆV = {〈λ, μ〉 : λ, μ ∈ V }.
We endow this scale with the following order relation >−:
〈λ, μ〉 >− 〈λ′, μ′〉 ⇐⇒ μ < μ′ or (μ = μ′ and λ > λ′).
Relation >− can be seen as the refinement of the second
order relation (over μ) by the first order relation (over λ).
The associated axiom is:
(D2−) (Pessimistic qualitative monotonicity)
 restricted over Cˆ satisfies the following condition:
[λ/x, μ/x]  [λ′/x, μ′/x] ⇐⇒ μ < μ′ or
(μ = μ′ and λ > λ′).
This axiom is pessimistic in the sense that the possibility
of obtaining x has more importance than the possibility of
getting x.
Now consider the following axiom:
(D4) (Generalized continuity) ∀x ∈ X, ∃σ ∈ Cˆ, x ∼ σ.
Axiom (D4) states that utilities of consequences can take
any value inside the square delimited by 〈0, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 1〉
and 〈1, 0〉 (see fig. 1). The representation theorem exploit-
ing this extended utility scale can be stated as follows:
Theorem 4 Under Condition (R),  on Πˆ∞(X) satisfies
Axioms (B1), (D2−), (B3) and (D4) if and only if there
exists a basic utility assignment u : X → UˆV such that
∀π, π′ ∈ Πˆ∞(X), π  π′ ⇐⇒ PU(π) >− PU(π′).
Proof. The proof is essentially similar to that of Theorem
2 of Giang and Shenoy (2001). For lack of space, we only
〈1, 0〉
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Figure 2: Scale for the lexicographic aggregation of U −
and U+.
sketch the proof for the ‘if’ part. First we prove that for any
lottery there exists a unique canonical lottery equivalent to
it. Under (R), Π∞(X) = Π(X). Therefore we just need
to consider simple lotteries. Let π = [π1/x1, . . . , πn/xn]
be a simple lottery. By (D4), ∀i, ∃σi ∈ Cˆ, xi ∼ σi.
Let σi = 〈λi/x, μi/x〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By (B3),
π ∼ π′ = [π1/σ1, . . . , πn/σn]. Lottery π′ has only two
possible outcomes x and x. Under (R), π ′ = [
∨n
i=1
(
πi ∧
λi
)
/x,
∨n
i=1
(
πi ∧ μi
)
/x]. This defines a unique function
PU(π) = 〈∨ni=1 (πi ∧ λi),∨ni=1 (πi ∧ μi)〉. As >− and
(D2−) have been defined altogether, the order induced by
(D2−) and >− are identical.
We could change Axiom (D4) to Axiom (D4r), restrict-
ing consequences to be measured on the segment 〈0, 1〉 to
〈1, 0〉 (see fig. 2):
(D4r) (Restricted continuity)
∀x ∈ X, ∃λ ∈ V, x ∼ [λ/x, n(λ)/x].
Using Axiom (D4r), the following theorem gives an
axiomatization of the lexicographic aggregation of pes-
simistic and optimistic utilities as a single decision crite-
rion for a single decision maker. Remark that we start with
a basic utility assignment valued in V (monodimensional)
and we obtain at the end a binary utility (bidimensional).
Theorem 5 Under Condition (R),  on Πˆ∞(X) satisfies
Axioms (B1), (D2−), (B3) and (D4r) if and only if there
exists a basic utility assignment v : X → V such that for
all π, π′ in Πˆ∞(X):
π  π′ ⇔ 〈U+(π), n(U−(π))〉 >− 〈U+(π′), n(U−(π′))〉.
Proof. From Theorem 4, if Axioms (B1), (D2−), (B3)
and (D4r) are satisfied then it exists u : X → UˆV such
that π  π′ iff PU(π) >− PU(π′), ∀π, π′ ∈ Π(X). By
(D4r), it exists v : X → V defined by ∀x ∈ X,u(x) =
〈v(x), n(v(x))〉. Then we can easily check that PU(π) =
〈U+(π), n(U−(π))〉.
Now if we have v : X → V that defines two util-
ity functions U+ and U−, we can define PU(π) =
〈U+(π), n(U−(π))〉. We have obviously Axiom (D4r) by
assumption. From Theorem 4, Axioms (B1), (D2−) and
(B3) are verified.
Replacing Axiom (D2−) by one of the following axioms
and defining an order relation associated to it provide re-
sults similar to Theorem 4 and 5:
(D2+) (Optimistic qualitative monotonicity)
 restricted over Cˆ satisfies the following condition:
[λ/x, μ/x]  [λ′/x, μ′/x] ⇐⇒ λ > λ′ or (λ = λ′ and
μ < μ′).
(D2=) (Neutral qualitative monotonicity)
 restricted over Cˆ satisfies the following condition:
[λ/x, μ/x]  [λ′/x, μ′/x] ⇐⇒ (λ > λ′ and μ ≤ μ′) or
(λ ≥ λ′ and μ < μ′).
Remark that the order defined by (D2=) is only partial.
Furthermore all these axioms boil down to (B2) when
(D4) is restricted to (B4).
5 LIMITATIONS OF THESE
APPROACHES
The binary possibilistic utility is an improvement over the
optimistic and pessimistic utility in terms of discrimination
power. However, it can not still differentiate certain simple
situations.
Example 1 Let X = {x1, . . . , x5}. These elements are
ordered in decreasing order. Then x = x1 and x = x5. Let
V = {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}. Define
the basic utility assignments as: Suppose that we have to
Table 1: Basic utility assignments
u(x1) u(x2) u(x3) u(x4) u(x5)
〈1, 0〉 〈1, 0.1〉 〈1, 1〉 〈0.1, 1〉 〈0, 1〉
choose between two alternatives: the first one gives for sure
gain x2, which is lottery [1/x2] and the second has two
equally possible outcomes x1 and x2, which is represented
by lottery [1/x1, 1/x2]. Then if we compute the PU val-
ues of these alternatives (〈1, 0.1〉), we deduce that they are
equivalent, which is quite counterintuitive as the second al-
ternative seems to have a better outlook.
Symmetrically we have the same problem with lotteries
[1/x4, 1/x5] and [1/x4].
A comparison between the number of equivalence classes
and the number of lotteries gives a first answer to this lim-
itation. The binary possibilistic utility has 2|V | − 1 equiv-
alence classes. The number of lotteries with k outcomes
with possibility 1 and all the other outcomes with possibil-
ity strictly less than 1 is
(|X|
k
)
(|V | − 1)|X|−k denotes the
number of . Then we count
∑|X|
k=1
(|X|
k
)
(|V |−1)|X|−k dif-
ferent lotteries in the whole set Π(X). Thus the number
of lotteries greatly outnumbers the number of equivalence
classes. That partly explains the coarseness of PU.
∼x
x
x
x
1
0.5
0.1
1
x
1
0.1
Figure 3: Reduction of compound lotteries.
Moreover an attentive look at the equivalence classes re-
veals that the situation is even worse. Indeed theses classes
are not uniformly distributed. The number of elements in
the classes 〈1, λ〉 and 〈λ, 1〉 increases as λ increases. In the
classes 〈1, 0〉 and 〈0, 1〉, there is only one element, respec-
tively [1/x] and [1/x]. The most populated equivalence
class is then 〈1, 1〉. This value is reached for a lottery as
soon as consequence of utility 〈1, 1〉 has possibility 1 or
consequences of utility 〈1, λ〉 and 〈μ, 1〉 are equally plau-
sible with possibility 1. These consequences hide all other
outcomes thus making equivalent all such lotteries.
Approaches like those presented in Section 4 could barely
give a better answer as the maximum number of equiv-
alence classes is |V |2. Another proposal due to Fargier
and Sabbadin (2003) is to introduce leximin and leximax
in place of operators∧ and ∨ to obtain refined criteria. The
content of Section 6, also based on leximin and leximax,
can be seen as a generalization of this approach in two di-
rections. First, our utility is binary, and second, thanks to
a new definition of possibilistic lotteries and mixtures, we
can distinguish more finely compound lotteries. Our lotter-
ies will be redefined on richer structures, which will allow
infinite equivalence classes.
6 REFINED BINARY POSSIBILISTIC
UTILITY
Before going into the detail of our formalism, we give an
intuition of the reasons why we would gain from a new def-
inition of lotteries. Under Condition (R), those two lotter-
ies are equivalent (see fig. 3): [1/x, 0.1/[1/x, 0.5/x]] and
[1/x, 0.1/x]. We think that under (R), compound lotter-
ies are oversimplified. Indeed the simple lottery contains
much less information than the compound one. The simple
lottery states that only two outcomes are possible: x and x
with respective possibilities 1 and 0.1. Whereas the com-
pound one can be interpreted as follows: we can get imme-
diate outcome x with possibility 1 or reach a new uncertain
situation represented by a possibilistic lottery [1/x, 0.5/x].
In this new uncertain situation, there is still a possibility
to get x. Resolution of uncertainty can be of special im-
portance like in dynamic decision making where resolution
of uncertainty can be sequential. That is why we want to
formalize the fact that this compound lottery represents a
better alternative than the simple one. In this aim, we need
to enrich the set on which lotteries are defined and to re-
place operators ∧ and ∨ by new operators so as to keep all
the informations encoded in lotteries.
We introduce a few notations that will be useful. Let X be a
set. We denote the set of all finite sequences of elements of
X by X∞ = ∪∞k=1Xk. If  is an order relation over X , we
defineRX : X∞ → X∞ the function that ranks sequences
of elements of X with respect to , eliminating doubles.
If (x′1, . . . , x′k) = RX(x1, . . . , xl) then k ≤ l, ∀i ≤ k,
x′i  x′i+1 and {x′1, . . . , x′k} = {x1, . . . , xl}. When there
is no risk of confusion, we will drop the subscript and sim-
ply write R for RX . An equivalence relation = on X
can be naturally extended on X∞, i.e. (x1, . . . , xk) =
(x′1, . . . , x
′
l) ⇐⇒ (k = l and ∀i ≤ k, xi = x′i). If
f : X → X is a function then f(X) denotes the image of
X by f , i.e f(X) = {y ∈ X : ∃x ∈ X, f(x) = y}.
With the above notations, the set of all finite sequences
of elements of V writes V ∞. Let V < denote the set of
all finite increasingly ordered sequences of elements of V ,
which is equal toR<(V ∞). Note that we have V ⊂ V < ⊂
V ∞. If λ is an element of V < then we write λi for the i-th
element of the sequence λ with the convention that if i is
greater than the length of λ, λi = 1.
A lexicographic order >lex is defined over V < as follows:
λ >lex λ
′ ⇐⇒ ∃i, λi > λ′i and ∀j < i, λj = λ′j . The
weak order is denoted ≥lex. This order is simply the lex-
imin on sequences of V .
Let W denote the set of all finite decreasingly ordered se-
quences of elements of V <. We have W = R>lex(V <).
Remark that V ⊂ W . This is the enriched set on which lot-
teries will be defined. If α is an element of W then we write
αi for the i-th element of the sequence α with the conven-
tion that if i is greater than the length of α, αi = 0. Note
that sequence αi is an element in V <. Then α1,1 denotes
the first element of the first sequence of sequence α.
Now we define a refined simple possibilistic lottery as a
function X → W . We call Π˜(X) the set of simple refined
lotteries. Note that the former definition of possibilistic lot-
tery is compatible with this new definition, i.e. Π(X) ⊂
Π˜(X). The set of all (simple or compound) refined lotter-
ies is denoted by Π˜∞(X) and we have Π∞(X) ⊂ Π˜∞(X).
The counterparts on W of operators ∨ and ∧ on V are re-
spectively denoted by  and  and are defined as follows:
αα′ = R>lex(α, α′)
α  α′ = R>lex((R<(αi, α′j))1≤i≤k,1≤j≤l) if α = 0
= 0 otherwise
where α (of length k) and α′ (of length l) are two elements
of W . Operator  merges two sequences and ranks them
with respect to >lex. Then
(
1, (0.5, 1)
)

(
1, (0.5, 0.6)
)
=(
1, (0.5, 1), (0.5, 0.6)
)
. Note that R>lex deletes doubles.
Operator  merges each element of the first sequence with
∼x
x
x
x
0.5
0.1
(1, (0.1, 1))
x
(0.1, 0.5)
1
1
Figure 4: Generalized Reduction of lotteries.
each element of the second sequence and ranks them with
respect to <. Finally the overall result is ranked with re-
spect to >lex. For instance
(
1, (0.5, 1)
)

(
1, (0.5, 0.6)
)
=
(
1, (0.5, 1), (0.5, 0.6, 1)
)
.
Condition (R) can be rewritten in this setting:
(RR) (Refined reduction of lotteries)
[α1/π1, . . . , αm/πm](x) =
m
i=1
αi  πi(x).
A look at an example of lottery should clarify these def-
initions. Suppose we have the following compound lot-
tery (see fig. 4): [1/x, 0.1/[1/x, 0.5/x]]. Then this lot-
tery is equivalent to the following refined simple lottery:
[(1, (0.1, 1))/x, (0.1, 0.5)/x]]. It is no longer equivalent to
[1/x, 0.1/x]. All the information encoded in the compound
lottery is retained after reduction. From this example, we
remark that reducing lotteries under (RR) does not lose in-
formation as under Condition (R).
Under Condition (RR), the set Π∞(X) can no longer be
equated to Π(X). In return we have Π˜∞(X) = Π˜(X).
We now proceed in the same manner as Giang and Shenoy
(2001). We first define the set of refined canonical lotteries
as:
RC = {[α/x, β/x] : α, β ∈ W,α1,1 ∨ β1,1 = 1}.
Note that this set defines the equivalence classes of our re-
fined criterion and is infinite. From this set we construct
the scale on which our utility will be measured. The re-
fined binary possibilistic utility will take values in
UW = {〈α, β〉 : α, β ∈ W,α1,1 ∨ β1,1 = 1}.
Remark that UV ⊂ UW . We need to endow this set with an
order relation >−W :
〈α, β〉 >−W 〈α′, β′〉 ⇔{ ∃i, (βi <lex β′i or (βi = β′i and αi >lex α′i))
and ∀j < i, (αj = α′j and βj = β′j)
This relation is quite similar to leximax applied on leximin
as presented in Fargier and Sabbadin (2003).
Operator  can be further extended on UW × UW :
〈α, β〉〈α′, β′〉 = 〈αα′, ββ′〉
Operator  can be further extended on W × UW :
α′  〈α, β〉 = 〈α′  α, α′  β〉.
The refined binary possibilistic utility (RPU) is then de-
fined as a function of Π˜∞(X) to UW :
RPU(π) =
n
i=1
π(xi)  u(xi). (5)
We list the axioms that are needed in the representation the-
orem of RPU:
(A1) (Preorder) is reflexive and transitive.
(A2−) (Pessimistic qualitative monotonicity)
[α/x, β/x]  [α′/x, β′/x]
⇐⇒
{ ∃i, (βi <lex β′i or (βi = β′i and αi >lex α′i))
and ∀j < i, (αj = α′j and βj = β′j)
(A3) (Substitutability)
π1 ∼ π2 ⇒ [α/π1, β/π] ∼ [α/π2, β/π].
Axioms (A1) and (A3) are very similar to Axioms (B1)
and (B3). In fact the latters are the restriction of the form-
ers to Π∞(X). Axiom (A2−) states that lotteries are lex-
icographically compared following their highest possibili-
ties first. Axiom (A2−) is pessimistic as the decision maker
gives more importance to outcome x than to outcome x.
We obtain the following representation theorem for RPU:
Theorem 6 Under Condition (RR),  on Π˜∞(X) satis-
fies Axioms (A1), (A2−), (A3) and (B4) if and only if
there exists a basic utility assignment u : X → UV such
that ∀π, π′ ∈ Π˜∞(X), π  π′ iff RPU(π) >−W RPU(π′).
Proof. The proof is essentially analogous to that of
Theorem 2 of Giang and Shenoy (2001).
Similar theorems can be formulated with Axioms (A2+) or
(A2=) in place of (A2−) and their associated order relation
over UW :
(A2+) (Optimistic qualitative monotonicity)
[α/x, β/x]  [α′/x, β′/x]
⇔
{ ∃i, (αi >lex α′i or (αi = α′i and βi <lex β′i))
and ∀j < i, (αj = α′j and βj = β′j)
(A2=) (Neutral qualitative monotonicity)
[α/x, β/x]  [α′/x, β′/x]
⇔
⎧⎨
⎩
∃i, ((αi ≥lex α′i and βi <lex β′i)
or (αi >lex α′i and βi ≤lex β′i))
and ∀j < i, (αj = α′j and βj = β′j)
Under Axiom (A2+) the decision maker first focuses on
outcome x and only after on x. Finally Axiom (A2=) gives
the same importance to both outcomes. Remark that Axiom
(A2=) only yields a partial order over lotteries. The order
relation defined by Axioms (A2+), (A2−) or (A2=) are all
compatible with the order relation defined by Axiom (B2).
Example 2 Lotteries in Π∞(X) can now be compared
more finely thanks to this new framework as RPU is very
discriminating. Indeed consider Example 1 again. We had
to compare two lotteries [1/x2] and [1/x1, 1/x2]. We can
compute their respective RPU:
RPU([1/x2]) = 〈1, (0.1, 1)〉
RPU([1/x1, 1/x2]) = 〈(1, 1), (0.1, 1)〉
Then under Axiom (A2+), (A2−) or (A2=), we have
[1/x1, 1/x2]  [1/x2], which is intuitively satisfying.
Similarly, lotteries [1/x4, 1/x5] and [1/x4] are no longer
equivalent. And under Axiom (A2+), (A2−) or (A2=), we
have [1/x4, 1/x5] ≺ [1/x4].
Finally we present an example involving lotteries whose
PU values are 〈1, 1〉. For instance, consider [1/x3] and
[1/x2, 1/x4]. PU tells us that these lotteries are equiva-
lent. Their RPU are:
RPU([1/x3]) = 〈1, 1〉
RPU([1/x2, 1/x4]) = 〈(1, (0.1, 1)), (1, (0.1, 1))〉
Then under Axiom (A2+), [1/x3] ≺ [1/x2, 1/x4]. Under
Axiom (A2−), [1/x3]  [1/x2, 1/x4]. And under Axiom
(A2=), [1/x3] and [1/x2, 1/x4] are incomparable.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a new system of axioms
(complete preorder, non triviality, weak independence and
continuity) for the binary possibilistic utility introduced
by Giang and Shenoy (2001). This new axiomatics is
more similar to those proposed for EU. We have axiomat-
ically made the relation explicit between PU and the lexi-
cographic aggregation of pessimistic and optimistic utility.
Although PU is an improvement over previously proposed
decision criteria, it suffers from a lack of discrimination
power. We have highlighted the possible sources of this
problem and proposed a refined version of PU thanks to
a redefinition of possibilistic lotteries and mixtures. This
new criterion can more finely discriminate lotteries as we
have shown on a few examples.
The exact relation of RPU with the criterion proposed by
Fargier and Sabbadin (2003) needs to be clarified. The na-
ture of this relation seems to be the same as that of PU with
optimistic and pessimistic utilities. But as there are sev-
eral ways to define an order relation over W , one can pre-
fer to use pessimistic, optimistic or neutral comparisons.
In Fargier and Sabbadin (2003), refinements of optimistic
and pessimistic utilities can be computed by means of a nu-
merical expected utility. We suspect that RPU can also be
computed that way.
Optimistic and pessimistic utilities have been extended in
sequential decision problems by Sabbadin (1999). The new
axiomatics that we have proposed here for PU underlines
that weak independence is verified. As this axiom is crucial
in dynamic decision problems, it appears that PU is also
consistent in sequential decision problems as established in
Perny et al. (2005). As a refinement of PU, RPU is likely to
be consistent in a dynamic setting. We leave this for future
works.
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